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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

ESTOPPEL AS AFFECTING TITLE TO REAL
PROPERTY
ELmER W. ROLLER, LL.B.
The broad doctrine of estoppel, which affects the most fundamental rights and pervades every branch of the law, has received
its greatest development within a comparatively recent time. The
purpose of estoppel is to prevent the perpetration of any fraud
through which an innocent party would be placed in a position to
his irreparable disadvantage. Insofar as this precluded an investigation into the truth of the facts, estoppel was criticized and
applied with reluctance.
The immediate purpose of estoppel, in its relation to title to
real property, is to maintain security of titles to land. An
estoppel affecting title to realty may arise either from matter in
writing or matter in pais. Estoppel by deed is the preclusion of
a party to a deed, and his privies, to deny, as against the other
party, and his privies, any fact asserted therein. Estoppel in
pais, also called equitable estoppel and estoppel by misrepresentation, is the preclusion of a party to deny that which, by his
previous words or conduct, he may have led another who in good
faith relies upon such words or conduct, to change his position to
such other's prejudice. Estoppel in pas was not regarded with
favor by the common-law judges; it is a doctrine of equitable
creation. Estoppel in pais may operate to transfer title in real
property as effectually as estoppel by deed. Knauf & Tesch Co.
v. Elkhart Lake S. & G. Co., 153 Wis. 3o6, 141 N. W. 70.
The grantor in a deed, which on its face purports, either expressly or by implication, to convey an estate of particular
description, will not be permitted, as against the grantee, to assert
that at the time of the execution of the deed he was without title
and that no title was transferred by the deed. This is clearly an
estoppel by deed, giving- rise to "title by estoppel" or "right by
estoppel." Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, ii How. (U. S.) 297;
Mutual Life Ins. Co., v. Corey, 135 N. Y. 326,31 N. E. io95. An
estoppel relating to an interest in land passes with the land..
Therefore it is binding on those who are in privity of estate wit
the original parties. The grantor and his privies are estopped a.
against the grantee and those in privity with him. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., v. Corey, supra. In Waterman v. Norwalk, 145 Wis.
663, the successor in title of a lot was estopped from denying the
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full effect of an instrument under seal executed by his grantor,
which, in language free from ambiguity, granted to a municipality
a certain easement and which clearly purported to be binding on
the assigns as well as the grantor.
It is clear that an estoppel by deed can operate only against a
grantor and those in privity with him. If, therefore, one without
authority or in excess of authority assumes to convey by deed the
land of another, no estoppel by deed can be raised against the
true owner. This is based upon the obvious principle that without a deed there can be no estoppel by deed. War Fork Land Co.,
v. Marcum, 18o Ky. 352, 202 S. W. 668. It is to be observed,
however, that while the true owner, under the above circumstances, cannot be estopped by deed, he may, nevertheless, be
estopped from asserting his title by matter in pais, that is, by his
conduct subsequent to his receiving notice of the fact that another
is bona fide claiming an adverse interest in the land and expending money in making improvements thereon. Sumner v. Seaton,
47 N. J. Eq. lO3. The7 case of War Fork Land Co. v. Marcum,
supra, is illustrative of these principles. In that case one John
Marcum, assuming to act without authority as attorney in fact of
Philip Marcum, conveyed the property in question to G. M. Pigg,
from whom, by mesne conveyances, it came into the possession of
the plaintiff land company. Subsequent to this spurious conveyance, Philip Marcum and his wife did appoint John Marcum
their attorney in fact to sell and convey their lands. About forty
years later Philip Marcum conveyed the lands in question to
James Marcum, the defendant in this action. It is apparent that
the defendant could not be estopped from asserting his title to the
land by the spurious deed to G. M. Pigg, since that was not the
deed of Philip Marcum. But it was contended that the failure of
Philip Marcum to take any measures to inquire into what John
Marcum had done as attorney in fact, was such laches as would
estop him from selling the land almost forty years later. The
court held that there was no matter in pais to create an estoppel;
that since John Marcum conveyed the land without authority,
title remained in Philip Marcum and the mere question of .time
could add nothing to the strength of the plaintiff land company
because it never received title to the land.
Where an agent, duly authorized by power of attorney, conveyed lands by warranty deed, which deed was executed and
acknowledged in all respects in the form of -a personal deed from
82

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

the agent, the deed, at least in form, not being the deed of the
principal, it was held that the principal was not estopped by the
covenant of warranty. It was further held that the agent, as
grantor in the deed, was estopped by the covenant of warraity.
North v. Henneberry, 44 Wis. 3o6.
The rules of estoppel pertaining to deeds, as such, are equally
applicable to mortgages. The mortgagor is estopped to assert
anything in derogation of the mortgage instrument. He is bound
by the covenants in the mortgage and will not be permitted to set
up, as against the mortgagee and his privies, any outstanding title
in another, nor will he be allowed to deny in himself such title as
this defeasible form of conveyance purports to pass. Caple v.
Switzer, 122 Mich. 636, 81 N. W. 560; Macloon v. Smith, 49 Wis.
200. In the latter case the court held that mortgagors who have
covenanted to defend title against adverse claims, are estopped to
allege title in a third person.
A person without title or a defective title to land, who assumes
to convey by a deed containing full covenants of warranty an
estate of particular description, and subsequently acquires an
estate or interest in the land, is estopped by the covenants of
warranty in his deed to set up, as against his grantee, such subsequently acquired interest or estate in the land. The grantor cannot convey his after-acquired estate or interest to a third person,
because he has divested himself of this power by his first warranty deed. The subsequently acquired interest or estate of the
grantor, therefore, immediately inures to the benefit of and becomes complete in, the grantee. The grantee has acquired his
title by estoppel. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Corey, supra; Van
Rensselaer v. Kearney, ii How. (U. S.) 297; Dye v. Thompson,
126 Mich. 597, 85 N. W. 1113 ; Henrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156;
Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; North v. Henneberry, supra;
Mclnnis v. Lyman, 62 Wis. 191, 22 N. W. 405. In the Henneberry case the agent, acting under a power of attorney, executed
a warranty deed which was in the form of a personal deed from
the agent, except that it described him as an attorney in fact
acting by virtue of a power of attorney from the owner and
described the premises as belonging to the owner. The court held
that the agent who executed the deed was estopped by its covenants from setting up a title subsequently acquired by him from
the principal. It was contended by counsel that the agent ought not
to be estopped from setting up the title subsequently acquired by
83
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him from the principal, because the deed on its face showed that
the agent was not the owner of the land at the time he executed
the conveyance. But the court answered (page 319) : "It is the
co'cnant which gives force to the estoppel, and'not so much the
implied or express statement in the deed that the grantor had title
at the date of the grant. The grantor will not be permitted to
hold the estate against his solemn covenant that he will defend his
grantee and his assigns in the full and perfect enjoyment of the
same forever."
And likewise, where one, who, having no title or a defective
title to land, gives a mortgage thereon containing covenants of
general warranty, or covenants of seisin and against incumbrances, subsequently acquires a title to such land, such afteracquired title immediately inures, by the doctrine of estoppel, to
the benefit of the mortgagee and those in privity with him.
Caple v, Switzer, 122 Mich. 636, 8i N. W. 560; Avery v. Judd,
21 Wis. 262.

Since an estoppel by deed arises from that which has been
covenanted, agreed and declared in the deed itself, it is clear that
nothing can be estopped which is not, expressly or by implication,
definitely agreed or alleged in the deed. In order to raise an
estoppel against the grantor, therefore, it is essential that the deed
on its face, either expressly or' by implication, reading the deed
in light of its whole content, clearly and directly purports to
convey absolutely an estate of particular description. And if
the invalidity of the grantor's title appears on the face of the
deed, clearly an estoppel is impossible. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, supra, Gilmer v. Poindexter,1o How. (U. S.) 257.
A quitclaim deed, being in effect nothing more than a release
of such right, title and interest as the grantor may have at the
time of the conveyance, passing no estate of particular description, will not generally raise an estoppel. A conveyance of all
the right which the grantor had or might have to land, will not
create an estoppel. "This legal effect can occur only where a
party has conveyed a precise or definite legal estate or right, by
a solemn assurance, which he will not be permitted to vary or
deny." Gilmer v. Poindexter,supra. A quitclaim deed will not,
therefore, operate to estop the grantor from setting up an afteracquired title. Jourdainv. Fox, 90 Wis. 99, 62 N. W. 936.
Where, however, in a deed quitclaim in form, reading the
instrument in light of its whole content, it is apparent that the
84
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parties intended that a particular estate or interest should pass by
the conveyance, the grantor will be estopped to deny such title in
himself or to set up in hostility thereto a title subsequently acquired by him. In the case of Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, supra,
the United States Supreme Court determined that from the
whole deed it was the intention of the grantors to convey and of
the grantees to receive, an estate of particular description. The
court (by Mr. Justice Nelson) said: "The general principle is
admitted, that the grantor, conveying by deed of bargain and
sale, by way of release or quitclaim of all his right and title to a
tract of land, it made in good faith and without any fraudulent
representations, is not responsible for the goodness of the title
beyond the covenants in his deed. 7 How. 159; 2 Sugden on
Vendors, ch. 12, sec. 2, p. 421; 2 Kent' Comm. 473; 4 Ib. 471
note; i Cow. 616; 9 Cow. 1; 4 Wend. 622; 7 Conn. 256; 1I Wend.
1io; S. C. i3 Wend. 78; 12 Pick. 78; 1 Rev. Stat. N. Y. 739,
secs. 143, 145; 15 Pick. 23; 14 Johns. 193. A deed of this character purports to convey and is understood to convey, nothing more
than the interest of which the grantor is seized or possessed at
the time; and does not operate to pass or bind an interest not then
in existence. The bargain between the parties proceeds upon
this view; and the consideration is regulated in conformity with
it. If otherwise, and the vendee has contracted for a particular
estate, or for an estate in fee, he must take the precaution to
secure himself by the proper covenants of title. But this principle
is applicable to a deed of bargain and sale by release or quitclaim,
in the strict and proper sense of that species of conveyance. And
therefore, if the deed bears on its face evidence that the grantors
intended to convey, and the grantee expected to become invested
with, an estate of particular description or quality, and the bargain had proceeded on that footing between the parties, then,
although it may not contain any covenants of title in the technical
sense of the term, still the legal operation and effect of the
instrument will be as binding on the grantor and those claiming
under him, in respect to the estate thus described, as if a formal
covenant to that effect had been inserted; at least so far as to
estop them from ever afterwards denying that he was seized of
the particular estate at the time of the conveyance." The opinion
in this case contains a very excellent review of the early decisions
on this subject.
At the early common law, it seems that a distinction was made
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between the case in which no interest in realty passed under a
warranty deed and the case in which some present interest, howevei small, passed under a deed containing general covenants of
warranty. Thus, where a grantor, having no title whatsoever in
the realty, assumed to convey by a deed containing covenants of
warranty, it was uniformly held that an estoppel was created,
which prevented the grantor from setting up any after-acquired
title in the property, but where the grantor had some present
interest in the premises, which passed under a deed containing
covenants of warranty, the rule seems to have been that there
was no estoppel and that the grantor was perr.itted to set up an
after-acquired title or interest in hostility to the title of his
grantee. "If any interest, however small, passes by a deed, it
creates no estoppel." 4 Kent Comm. 98. It is doubtful whether
this was, in fact, the early rule. It is generally believed that this
distinction was intended to be limited to leases and to have no
application to deeds. Bigelow, Estoppel (5th ed.) 291.
And it is quite certain that no such distinction has been made
in the American decisions. House v. McCormick, 57 N. Y. 31o;
Thompson vo. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 28 N. E. 627; Dye v.
Thompson, supra; Myrick v. Kahle, 120 Wis. 57, 97 N. W. 506;
Weisner v. Zaun, 39 Wis. 188.
In the leading American decision on this subject, House v.
McCormick, supra, the court renounces the ancient exception in
the following language: "It is further claimed-that there is no
estoppel created by the deed-because another exception, well
recognized in the doctrine of estoppel, is thus stated by Chancellor Kent (4 Cowen, 98) : "If the lease takes effect by passing an
interest, it cannot operate by way of estoppel, even though it
cannot operate by way of interest to the full extent of the intention of the parties. If any interest, however small, passes by a
deed, it creates no estoppel." This claim is untenable. Although
the last remark in the statement apparently applies to a deed as
well as a lease, it is evident from the connection in which it is
used, that it was intended to apply to a lease only. It is, therefore, unnecessary, now, to call it in question. It is to be construed
as having application to leasehold interests only; . . . . It may,
also, be conceded that there will not be an estoppel so as to give a
grantee the benefit of a subsequently acquired estate, where any
interest passes under a deed of bargain and sale, or quitclaim, or,
by any conveyance containing no covenants; but the rule or
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exception claimed does not apply where the deed by which the
premises are conveyed contains express covenants of warranty
or quiet enjoyment. The question in such -cases, as in all other
cases arising out of the construction of deeds, is one of intention;
and where it appears to have been the object of the covenant to
assure to the grantee, or covenantee, the full and absolute enjoyment of the property, without any right of the grantor to divest
or interfere with the possession at any time thereafter, there is no
reason or principle why it should not operate as an estoppel to
avoid circuity of action against a claim of the grantor to a subsequently acquired estate, where a present right or interest, in
fact, passed at the time the grant was made, as well as when
nothing whatever passed."
In Myrick v. Kahle, supra, B. E. Edwards was the holder of
tax deeds and certificates to certain lots. In 1885, he and his wife
deeded their interest to the appellant, the holder of the original
title, covenanting "that neither I, the said B. E. Edwards, nor
my heirs nor any person or persons claiming by, through or under
us or them shall at any time hereafter by any way or means have,
claim or demand any right, title, interest or estate by, in or to the
aforesaid premises or appurtenances or to any part or parcel
thereof, forever." In 189i, Edwards obtained a tax deed to these
lots, on the tax certificate issued in I885, which he held when he
made the deed. It was held that such interest as Edwards may
have acquired by the tax deed of 1891, inured to the benefit of the
appellant by virtue of the covenant in the deed of 1885.
Where a deed containing general covenants of warranty, conveys a present interest or estate in real property, a title subsequently acquired by the grantor will inure to the benefit of the
grantee, whether such after-acquired title be acquired by purchase
or vest in the grantor by descent. In Weisner v. Zaun, supra,A,
tenant by courtesy and owner in fee of an undivided one-sixth
part of land, as heir-in-lawr of a deceased son, conveyed the same
to Z, the grantor of the defendant. The deed purported on its
face to convey the entire tract of land. Subsequently, A acquired
another one-sixth interest in fee, which he inherited as heir of
his son. The court held that the one-sixth interest subsequently
acquired by A by descent, by virtue of the covenant of warranty
in the deed, inured to the benefit of the defendant's grantor (A's
grantee) by way of estoppel.
As was announced in the case of North v. Henneberry, supra,
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it is the covenant which gives force to the estoppel and prevents
the grantor from setting up a subsequently acquired title. Where,
however, a deed, although containing general covenants of warranty, purports to convey only that title and interest of which the
grantor is possessed at the time of the conveyance, the general
covenants of warranty are construed to have been limited to the
estate or interest actually conveyed by the deed and the grantor
is not estopped to set up a title subsequently acquired. If on the
face of the deed there is no recital as to the quantum of the estate
intended to be conveyed, other than the right, title and interest
of the grantor, -the general covenants will be construed, not as
warranting a perfect and complete title, but they will be construed
as limited to or restrained by that right, title and interest described in the deed.
In the case of Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156, the deed
containing covenants of warranty, described -the grant as "one
undivided half of all my right, title, and interest in and to the
following described lands." It was held that the covenants of
warranty relate only to the estate or interest actually conveyed
by the deed; that the conveyance and the covenants of warranty
are confined to the right, title and interest described in the deed;
that, therefore, the covenants of warranty are inoperative to pass
an after-acquired title.
Thus we see that a covenant of warranty, in and of itself, will
not be held to pass a subsequent acquired title, which would have
the effect of enlarging the estate actually conveyed. In the unique
case of Mfg. Co. v. Ze~lmer, 48 Minn. 408, 50 N. W. 379, a deed
of mortgaged land contained a covenant against incumbrances.
The only reference to the mortgage in the deed was to except it
from the covenant against incumbrances. The court held that the
exception of the mortgage did not operate to modify, limit or in
any way restrain the covenant of warranty and that therefore, any
title subsequently acquired by the grantor by the foreclosure of
the mortgage, would, by the doctrine of estoppel, inure to the
benefit of the grantee. In the later case of Rooney v. Koenig,
go Minn. 483, 83 N. W. 399, the court explained its former
decision by making the following distinction: "If land is conveyed by warranty deed subject to the mortgage, or the grantee
in the deed assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage as part of the
purchase price, the case is not within the rule as to title by
covenant, which we have stated, and the grantor in such a case
88
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may purchase and enforce the mortgage against the land." Meritt
v. Byers, 46 Minn. 74,48 N. W. 417; Walther v. Briggs, 69 Minn.
98, 7i N. W. 9o9.
"Estoppel by misrepresentation, or equitable estoppel, is defined
as the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting
rights which might prehaps have otherwise existed, either of
property, contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who
in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby
to change his position to the worse, and who on his part acquires
some corresponding right either of contract or of remedy."
Kimball v.Baker Land & T. Co., 152 Wis. 44I. Title by estoppel
in pais, unlike estoppel by deed, does not arise from the solemn
covenants of a party, but from his acts, representations,
admissions, silence, laches and negligence. With reference to
title by estoppel, estoppel in pais may operate to pass title to
realty from one person to another as effectually as estoppel by
deed. Knauf & Tesch Co. v. Elkhart Lake S. & G. Co., 153 Wis.
3o6, 141 N. W. 70.
It is essential to an estoppel in pais that the acts or omissions set
up by way of estoppel relate to material fact and are of such
character as are naturally calculated to induce a reasonably prudent and careful man to believe that they were intended to be acted
upon. In Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, 86 N. Y. 221, the
court observes that in order to have a title by estoppel in pais
against the owner of lands, "there must be shown, we think,
either actual fraud, or fault or negligence, equivalent to fraud
on his part, in concealing his title; or that he was silent when
the circumstances would impel an honest man to speak; or
such actual intervention on his part, as in Storrs v. Baker (6
Johns. Ch. [N. Y.] I66), as to render it just, that as between
him and the party acting upon his suggestion, he, should
bear the loss. Moreover, the party setting up the estoppel, must
be free from -theimputation of laches, in acting upon the belief of
ownership by one who has no right."
In the case of Kingman v. Graham, 51 Wis. 232, 8 N. W. 181,
in which this principle was directly in issue, the court laid down
the rule that in order to estop the owner of lands from asserting
his title, on the ground that he induced the party setting up the
estoppel to believe that title was in another, there must be an
89
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intention to decieve and mislead, or negligence so gross as to
amount to a constructive fraud. "If there is a positive misrepresentation, it in general suffices if' it be made either with the
intention that another should act upon it, or with knowledge that
he is about to act, or under such circumstances that a reasonable
man would know that it would be acted upon." Later cases would
seem to indicate (Marshall, J. observes in Knauf & Tesch Co. v.
Elkhart Lake S. & G. Co., supra), that, "to designedly or inexcusably mislead another is sufficient."
Mariner v. City of
Milwaukee, 146 Wis. 605.
Kingman v. Graham, supra, was an action of ejectment. It
appeared that -theplaintiff, Kingman, had a duly recorded title to
an undivided -two-thirds of certain real property which he had
purchased from his father. His father had a lease of the whole
property and negotiated with the defendant, Graham, for a
partnership in a business to be conducted by means of this
property. By the terms of the partnership agreement, a certain
valuation was to be placed on this property and the defendant was
to put into the partnership, material to -the same amount. The
plaintiff was not in any way connected with the partnership
contract, but he was present at the time when the contract was
made. He made no assertion as to his ownership of any interest
in the land. The defendant at the time honestly believed that the
plaintiff's father was the owner of a two-thirds interest in the
property. He testified that he would not have entered into the
partnership agreement had he known that the plaintiff's father
was not -the owner of such interest. The defendant further
testified that, acting upon this belief, he extended to the plaintiff's
father credit which he would not have given him had he known
the true state of the title. It appears that the defendants in order
to collect the amount of this indebtedness to them, attached the
said two-thirds interest, sold it on execution and purchased it at
such sale. The terms of the partnership agreement implied and led
the defendant, Graham, to believe that the plaintiff's father was
the owner of said interest in the property. The defendant contended that the failure of the plaintiff to assert his own title to the
property at the time when the partnership agreement was entered
into, estopped him from asserting his title in ejectment. The court
decided that the facts were insufficient to estop the plaintiff from
asserting his title, on the ground that there was nothing in the
partnership contract which amounted to a claim on the part of
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the plaintiff's father that he was the owner of two-thirds of the
property and that, -therefore, there was no reason to require the
plaintiff to assert his ownership and deny ownership in his father.
In the case of Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Day, 102 Wis. 328,
78 N. W. 440, the plaintiff corporation, owner of pine timber
lands, was requested by the defendants to fix its price on certain
lands which included the tract in question. The plaintiff company
gave its price on all lands, except the tract in question, stating to
the defendants that this particular tract "we do not own." It
had knowledge at the time that the defendants were logging pine
lands in the vicinity and were on the market for such lands.
Furthermore the disclaimer was made with knowledge of the
fact that one B. claimed to own the particular tract in question
under a tax deed and was offering the same for sale. The
defendants, relying on the plaintiff's disclaimer, purchased the
tract in question from B. In this action the defendants sought
to establish title by estoppel and -their position was sustained by
the appellate court. The plaintiff contended that it was not
estopped from asserting its -titleto the tract in question because
the disclaimer was not made with knowledge that the defendants
proposed to act on it, and that therefore, it amounted to nothing
more than a mere casual statement which was insufficient to found
an estoppel. The court answered -the contention: "The general
rule is that the statement relied on as an estoppel must be made
with an intent to be acted upon, and without knowledge that
the other party is contemplating such action; but it by no means
follows that the intended action must be definitely and positively
known to the maker of the statement. If the circumstances
are such that a reasonable man, under the circumstances, would
anticipate that it was to be acted on, it will be sufficient."
It is a universal rule that in order to establish an estoppel
in pais, it is essential that the party claiming the estoppel should
have relied on the misrepresentation in good faith, without
knowledge or the means available for acquiring knowledge, of
the true state of facts. The party seeking to establish the estoppel
in pais against the true owner of lands must show that he relied
on the misrepresentation of the true owner, in good faith, without
knowledge of the true state of the title and without the available
means of acquiring that knowledge. Actual occupancy of the
premises by the true owner must sufficiently apprise all of his
claim of ownership. The record of title is a constructive notice
9'
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to all the world which binds every person to examine and respect the true owner's title and it therefore constitutes an
available and convenient means of acquiring knowledge of the
true state of the title. Ford v. Smith, 27 Wis. 261 Kingman v.
Graham, supra; Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Day, supra.
The mere fact that the owners deed is on record, however, will
not avail the true owner of the premises against a claim of title
by estoppel, where such owner, by an affirmative misrepresentation, induces the person claiming the estoppel -to believe that he
is not the true owner of the premises. It would be highly
inequitable, first to permit the true owner of realty, by some
affirmative misrepresentation, to induce an innocent party to
honestly believe and act upon the belief, that title -to the land is
in another, and then, when the true owner's title is assailed, to
permit toi point with immunity to his record of title. The record
of title may not be used as an instrument to accomplish the
perpetration of fraud, against which the whole doctrine of estoppel
is directed. In Two Rivers Mfg. Co. v. Day, supra, in which the
plaintiff corporation positively stated to the defendants that it did
not own the tract of land in question, the fact that the plaintiff
company's title was on record and open to examination by the
defendants, was no defense to the claim of estoppel because the
absolute disclaimer of the plaintiff company was such as to encourage and mislead the defendants into making expenditures
upon the bad or doubtful title.
And the record of title is no defense to a claim of estoppel
in pais, in a case where -the true owner of lands has actual
knowledge that another is bona fide claiming title or right thereto
in ignorance of the true owner's title. It is not permitted that
the true owner shall stand idly by and suffer an innocent party to
purchase and expend money upon the premises, or to exercise acts
of dominion and ownership over the property, under the honest
but mistaken belief that he has title thereto. The fact that the
party who is acting in good faith upon the mistaken belief that
he is the owner of the premises could have easily discovered the
true state of the title by examining the records, will not preclude
him from setting up an estoppel against the true owner who had
knowledge of the innocent mistake but who stood by in silence.
The silence of the true owner, who has knowledge of the mistake,
becomes a fraud. Under these circumstances, equity makes it
incumbent on the true owner to assert his title, notwithstanding
92
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that it may be recorded, or to be estopped from ever afterwards
asserting it, upon the maxim "qui tacet, consentire videtur; qui
potest et debet vetare, jubet si non vetat." Sumner v.Seaton,
47 N. J. Eq.iO3 ;Kingman v. Graham,supra;Mariner v. City of
Milwaukee, supra; Wetutzke v. Wetutzkc, i58 Wis. 305, 148
N. W. io88.
Sumner v. Seaton, supr, was an action to enjoin the defendant
from further prosecuting an action of ejectment against the
complainant at law. It appeared that the complainant's grantor
and the defendant owned lands in severalty which met in the
center of a street. A change in the lines of the street, made by
the municipality, left a narrow strip of the defendant's land on
the opposite side of the new street. The complainant's grantor
simply added thisstrip of land to his lot by fencing it in. The
land including the strip in question, was conveyed to the complainant, who believing -that she owned to the street, erected a house
thereon. Meanwhile the defendant stood silently by and asserted
no claim to any part of the complainant's lands. It was held that
the defendant was estopped from claiming possesion of -the strip
of land in question, not withstanding that his title was on record
and the complainant, by examining the record, might easily have
discovered the true state of his title.
In Kingman v. Graham, supra,it was distinctly held that where
the true owner's title is recorded, mere silence on his part, while
another person claims title to the property in question with a view
to having a third person act upon such claim, will not estop the
true owner from asserting his title to the realty against the; third
person who has acted upon the claim of title to his detriment.
But the court points out that if the true owner has knowledge
of the fact that another person is about to act in ignorance of the
true state of the title, notwithstanding that the true owner's title
is recorded, good faith may require him to speak, and failure to
speak may estop him from asserting his title. "The question is
not so much what the party setting up the estoppel might or ought
to have known or supposed, as what he actually did know and
suppose to the knowledge of the other party." Sumner v. Seaton,
supra. Of course the silence of the true owner who has no
cnowledge of the fact that another is acting under the mistaken
)pinion respecting the title to premises, can work no estoppel;
n such case the record of title is a complete protection. Sumner
,.Seaton, supra.
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The following language from Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron
Co., 93 U. S. 326, was quoted and approved by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in the case of Kingman v. Graham, supra; "Thus
where title has been recorded, it may fairly be presumed that subsequent purchasers have used the means pointed out by law, and
acquired all the knowledge which is important for them to have,
or that they will do so. When, however, the owner is directly
apprised of the ignorance of the buyer, and of his purpose to
act in such ignorance, he cannot claim the benefit of this principle, because good faith then requires him to speak." Where
the true owner of property stands by and sees another selling
or mortgaging it under a claim of title in good faith, without
asserting his title, he is estopped from afterwards asserting his
title against the innocent purchaser or mortgagee. Wetutzke v.
Wetutzke, supra.
Where the true state of the title is known to both of the parties,
or both have same means of acquiring knowledge as to the true
state of the title, there cannot be an estoppel. Brant v. Virginia
Coal & Iron Co., supra. Thus in Warner v. Fountain, 28 Wis.
405, it was held that where both parties were equally ignorant
of the true boundary, the fact that A. permitted B. to erect a
house on his land, and built a division fence between the premises claimed and occupied by himself and those claimed and occupied by B., would not estop A. from claiming the premises
occupied and claimed by B.
It is also essential to an estoppel in pais that the party claiming the estoppel, in reliance on the misrepresentation of the party
sought to be estopped, shall have changed his position so as to
render it impossible, or inequitable to restore the parties to status
quo. Sweitusch v. Luehring, 156 Wis. 96. In the unique case
of Mariner v. City of Milwaukee, supra, -the plaintiff Mariner
claimed title to a certain lot by virtue of two tax deeds. He
knew that the city claimed title to the lot and that the lot had
not been assessed and was not being taxed. During a period
of thirty-two years he paid no taxes on the lot and did nothing
to apprise the city, ot his title to the lot. It was held that by his
silence he was estopped from asserting title as against the city.
The court said: "It would be no invasion of the domain of common knowledge to say that during the thirty-odd years that Mr.
Mariner claimed to own the lot the taxes thereon with the prevailing rates of interest added thereto would, if the lot had been
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taxed, amount to a sum approximating its entire value, if indeed
it would not exceed such value. Mr. Mariner benefited himself or his estate by his silencei and inaction to the extent of that
sum whatever it might be, if he was the owner of this lot at the
time of his death. The city has lost, or it would be more accurate to say that the other taxpayers of Milwaukee have been
required to make up, this. sum . . . But where a municipal
corporation acts in good faith on a mistaken assumption for a
long series of years, and a taxpayer knows that it is acting
on such an assumption and remains silent, and in fact takes
an involuntary contribution from the municipality from year to
year, he is pursuing a course of conduct that is hardly consistent with fair dealing. We think it was incumbent on Mr.
Mariner within some reasonable time to notify the city of his
interest in the lot and call its attention to the fact that the same
had not been assessed. Instead of doing this he allowed the city
to treat the lot as its own, and has in effect deprived it of a large
amount of revenue."
In Wright Lumber Co. v. McCord, 145 Wis. 93, it was held
that where a wife, believing that her husband was not legally
divorced from her, and knowing that he was setting up another as
his lawful wife and that such other was joining in conveyances
of lands to innocent purchasers, and having full knowledge of
her own rights in such lands, did not assert any right or interest
in the lands or in any way apprise the innocent purchasers of
her claim therein, she is estopped by her silence from claiming
dower in such lands, as against the innocent purchasers for
value.

